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Abstract
We produce a model with pre-marital schooling investment,endogenuos mar-
ital matching and spousal specialization in homework and market production
Pre-marital investments generate two kinds of returns: a labor-market return
due to the education premium and a marriage-market return because educa-
tion can improve the intra-marital share of the surplus one can extract from
marriage. When the returns to education are gender neutral, men and women
educate in equal proportions and there is pure positive assortative matching
in the marriage markets. But if the returns are not gender neutral, then there
is mixing in equilibrium where some educated individuals marry uneducated
spouses and those who educate less because their labor-market return is lower
extract a relatively larger share of the marital surplus. Conditional on the
choice of schooling, couples’ career decisions aﬀect the size of their marital
surplus, but the existence of large and frictionless marriage markets can still
produce eﬃcient household specialization where the higher-wage spouse spe-
cializes in market production and the lower-wage spouse engages in homework.
Even when cultural and social norms or the time requirements of homework
dictate that wives devote relatively more time to homework, women can ac-
quire more schooling than men if a gender wage gap exists but narrows with
the level of education,.
1 Introduction
One of the pronounced trends in recent decades is the increased investment in educa-
tion by women and the closing of the gap in schooling between men and women. In
several developed countries, women now have more schooling than men. Beyond the
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1important impact of schooling on the earning capacity of women and their economic
independence, such trends inﬂuence the gains from marriage and marriage patterns.
Couples sort according to schooling and, therefore, the educational gap within cou-
ples has declined too. At the same time we observe a decline in marriage and higher
divorce rates, suggesting that the closing of the educational gaps had a larger inﬂu-
ence on those who remain single than on those who marry. Women today receive
lower wages and spend more time at home than men, although these gaps have nar-
rowed over the years. One would think, therefore, that women should invest less in
schooling, which appears to be less useful for them both at home and in the market.
Yet, women have increased their schooling attainments sharply and now acquire more
schooling than men.
Goldin et al. (2006) discuss the rise in investments in schooling of men and women
and show that starting with the 1970 birth cohort, women have attained higher college
graduation rates than men. Goldin (1997) provides a vivid and detailed description
of the changes in the career and schooling choices of women in the last century. She
compares female college graduates of several birth cohorts. Women who graduated
from college during the early part of the twentieth century (1900 -1920) had sacriﬁced
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percent of them never married. Women of later cohorts were able to mix family life
with a career, but they altered the timing of their career and family-life choices. Those
who graduated from college prior 1965 gradually raised their marriage and fertility
rates and they typically had children before entering the labor market. In contrast,
women who graduated from college after 1965 had lower marriage and fertility rates
and they tended to start to work before having children.
These demographic changes were also associated with changes in the patterns
of assortative mating by schooling. The degree of positive assortative matching by
schooling has risen over time. But while college-educated women in the earlier birth
cohorts married up and most of them had a college-educated husband, the rate of
marrying up declined among educated-women of later cohorts because there were
more educated women in those cohorts.
In contrast to other attributes such as race and ethnic background, schooling is
an acquired trait and within some limits subject to choice. Presumably, agents who
invest in schooling take into account the potential gains both in the labor market
and within marriage. However, the gains from schooling within marriage strongly
depend on the decisions of others to acquire schooling. Because much of schooling
happens before marriage, partners cannot coordinate their investments. Rather, men
and women make their choices separately, based on the anticipation of marrying a
“suitable” educated spouse with whom the investments in schooling are expected to
generate a higher return.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple general equilibrium framework
for the joint determination of pre-marital schooling and choices couples make during
their marriage. Hence, an important feature of the model is that the investment
2choices of both men and women are established simultaneously. In our model, the
returns to pre-marital investments can be decomposed into two parts: First, higher
education raises ones wage rate and increases the payoﬀ from time on the job (the
labor-market return). Second, it can improve the intra-marital share of the surplus
one can extract from marriage (the marriage-market return).1
The basic ingredients of our model are as follows. We consider a frictionless
marriage market and assume that, conditional on the predetermined spousal schooling
levels, the assignments are stable. That is, there are no men or women (married or
single) who wish to form a new union and there are no men or women who are married
but wish to be single. We then assume transferable utility between the spouses to
characterize the stable assignment. We further assume that there men and women
who can be divided into schooling classes (high and low) and the interactions between
married spouses depend only on their education class. In particular, although men
and women have idiosyncratic preferences for marriage and investment in schooling,
they all have the same ranking over spouses of the opposite sex which depend only
on their schooling. Thus, every educated man (woman) and every uneducated man
(woman) has a perfect substitute. The absence of rents allows us to pin down the
shares of the marital surplus of men and women in each schooling class. These shares,
t o g e t h e rw i t ht h ek n o w nr e t u r n sa ss i n g l e s ,a r es u ﬃcient to determine the investments
in schooling of men and women.
Our main results are that, when the market return to education and household
roles are gender neutral, men and women acquire education in equal proportions and,
under the assumption that the schooling of the two spouses complement each other,
a strictly positive assortative matching arises in the marriage markets. That is, edu-
cated men marry only educated women and uneducated men marry only uneducated
women. But if the returns are not gender neutral, then there is mixing in equilibrium
where some educated individuals marry uneducated spouses and individuals of the
gender that marries down obtains a lower return from schooling within marriage. In
particular, we show that a transition from an old regime in which women are required
to work at home and expect lower market wages to a new regime where less work
is required at home and the wages of educated women become more in line with
that of educated men, women may overtake men in terms of schooling, despite their
lower market wage rate and higher amount of housework compared with men. We
hypothesize that the increase in the levels of schooling investment by women to and
above the levels of men is a consequence of the higher return that women receive for
schooling, reﬂecting lower labor market “discrimination” at higher levels of school-
ing.2 The essence of the argument we make is that education can serve as a means
1Educational attainment could inﬂuence intra-marital spousal allocations directly (due to the
fact that education raises household income) or indirectly (to the extent that educational attainment
inﬂuences prospects for marriage and the determination of spousal roles within marriage.
2Mincer and Polachek (1974) and Weiss and Gronau (1981) provided explanations for the main
patterns of the gender wage gap even in the absence of any discrimination based on lower investments
3to escape discrimination.3 Educated women are also more likely to marry in the new
regime. However, when educated women become relatively abundant their share in
the marital surplus declines.
2 Background
We begin with a brief description of the main facts that we wish to address. Figure
1 describes the time trends in level of completed schooling of men and women, aged
30 to 40, in the United States. As seen, the proportions of women with some college
education, college education and advanced degrees (M.A., Ph.D.) have increased much
faster than the corresponding proportions for men. By 2003, women had overtaken
men in all of these three categories. Goldin et al. (2006) present trends for college
graduation by gender and show that starting with the 1970 birth cohort, women have
attained higher college graduation rates than men.
Figure 2 presents the time trends in the hourly wage diﬀerentials by schooling for
men and women in the United States (for those who work at least 20 hours a week
a n da d j u s t e df o rp o t e n t i a lw o r ke x p e r i e n c e ) . 4 Compared with high school, women
receive a higher increase in wages than men when they acquire college or advanced
degrees. These gender diﬀerences in the returns to schooling tend to widen with the
level of schooling and narrow with time. They are positive and statistically signiﬁcant
for most years.
As is well known, gender wage diﬀerences are confounded by a variety of selection
processes: selection into marriage, selection into schooling and selection into work.
To disentangle all these eﬀects is beyond the scope of this work (see Mulligan and
Rubinstein, 2005). However, if we restrict the sample to “full time, full year” workers
(who reported at least 35 hours a week and 51 weeks of work last year), the female
advantage in the returns to schooling in the CPS is signiﬁcant only for advanced
degrees between the years 1968 and 1999, but is usually insigniﬁcant for other degrees.
This suggests that additional schooling favors women mainly in terms access (or
commitment) to full-time jobs.5
on the job resulting from expected interruptions in participation. At that time, women also acquired
less schooling. The current reversal in the schooling gender gap poses a challenge to this approach.
3Discrimination here simply means that conditioned on their level of schooling, women expect
lower wages than men during their work career. This outcome can result from a variety of causes
including self selection of women into part-time jobs with lower wages and weaker incentives for
women to acquire, or for employers to provide, on the job training.
4The sample includes whites aged 25 to 60. Observations with hourly wages of less than 1 or
more than 400 dollars were excluded. The presented coeﬃcients are from year-by-year separate
regressions for men and women with log hourly wages as the dependent variable and highest degree,
experience and experience-squared as explanatory variables.
5A familiar conceptual issue is which variables should be held ﬁxed when one considers the
impact of schooling. It seems that for the analysis of schooling investment, variables such as hours
4Positive assortative matching by schooling is prevalent and about half of the mar-
ried couples have the same levels of schooling. This proportion remained stable over
time. However, the proportion of couples in which the husband has a higher degree
than his wife declined with time and in the most recent cohort it is the wife that
is more educated than her husband among young couples for whom the husband is
30 to 40 years old (see Figure 3). For married couples in the decades 1970-1979 and
1990-1999, Figure 4 shows the distribution of the spouse’s education for husbands
and wives with diﬀerent level of schooling. At low levels of schooling, each gender
mainly marries similarly-educated individuals of the opposite sex. This pattern be-
came more prevalent over time as the distribution of education among women and
men became more similar. In particular, we see a large increase in marriages where
the husband and the wife have some college education. Because the number of women
with some college has risen sharply relative to men, we see that husbands with some
college attainment have substituted wives with high school with wives with some
college education, while wives with some college education replaced men with col-
lege education and higher degrees with men with some college attainment. However,
at higher levels of schooling (such as B.A. and more) and among whom women are
still relatively scarce, we see that more highly-educated men still marry down while
college-educated women marry up.
3 The Basic Model
We begin with a benchmark model in which men and women are completely symmet-
ric in their preferences and opportunities. However, by investing in schooling, agents
can inﬂuence their marriage prospects and labor market opportunities. Competition
over mates determines the assignment (i.e., who marries whom) and the shares in
the marital surplus of men and women with diﬀerent levels of schooling, depending
on the aggregate number of women and men that acquire schooling. In turn, these
shares together with the known market wages guide the individual decisions to invest
in schooling and to marry. We investigate the rational-expectations equilibrium that
arises under such circumstances.
of work and job characteristics, and perhaps even experience, should be allowed to vary. Mulligan
and Rubinstein (2005) show that, in the CPS, the gender wage gap declines with schooling if one
compares men and women who work full time but does not control for experience. Dougherty (2005)
and O’Neill and O’Neill (2006) show, using NLSY data, that the gender diﬀerences in the impact
of schooling are eliminated when detailed employment and occupational characteristics are added.
Gronau (1998) shows, using PSID data, that education strongly aﬀects access to on the job training
opportunities, but the diﬀerence between men and women in this regard is not signiﬁcant.
53.1 Assumptions
There are two equally large populations of men and women to be matched. Individuals
live for two periods. Each person can choose whether to acquire schooling or not and
whether and whom to marry. Investment takes place in the ﬁrst period of life and
marriage in the second period. Investment in schooling is lumpy and takes one period
so that a person who invests in schooling works only in the second period, while a
person who does not invest works in both periods. To simplify, we assume no credit
markets.6 A l li n d i v i d u a l sw i t ht h es a m es c h o o l i n ge a r nt h es a m ew a g er a t ea n dw e
denote the wage of an educated person by w2 and the wage of an uneducated person
by w1 where w2 >w 1. Market wages are taken as exogenous and we do not attempt
t oa n a l y z eh e r et h ef e e d b a c k sf r o mt h em a r r i a g em a r k e ta n di n v e s t m e n t si ns c h o o l i n g
to the labor market. We shall discuss, however, diﬀerent wage structures.
We denote a particular man by i and a particular woman by j. The schooling
level (class) of man i by I(i) where I(i)=1if i is uneducated and I(i)=2if he is
educated. Similarly, we denote the class of woman j by J(j) where J(j)=1if j is
uneducated and J(j)=2if she is educated. The surplus generated by a marriage of
man i and woman j is
sij = zI(i)J(j) + θi + θj, (1)
where θi and θj represent the non-economic gains of man i and woman j from their
marriage and zI(i)J(j) is the material surplus that the marriage generates. Married
partners can divide their material surplus and their utilities are linear in the shares
(transferable utility).
We assume that the schooling levels of married partners complement each other
so that
z11 + z22 >z 12 + z21. (2)
When men and women are viewed symmetrically, we also have z12 = z21.
The per-period material utilities of man i and woman j as singles are denoted by
zI(i)0 and z0J(i) a n da r ea s s u m e dt oi n c r e a s ei nI(i) and J(j). Thus, a more educated
person has a higher utility as a single. Men and women who acquire no schooling
and never marry have life time utilities of 2z10 and 2z01, respectively. A person
that invests in schooling must give up the ﬁrst period utility and, if he\she remains
single, the life time utilities are z20 for men and z02 for women. Thus, the (absolute)
return from schooling for never married men and women are Rm = z20 − 2z10 and
Rw = z02 −2z01, respectively.7 The return to schooling of never-married individuals
d e p e n d so n l yo nt h e i ro w nm a r k e tw a g e sa n dw es h a l lr e f e rt oi ta st h elabor-market
return. A married person has an additional return from schooling investment because
6Allowing borrowing and lending raises issues such as whether or not one can borrow based on
the income of the future spouse and enter marriage in debt (see Browning et al., in progress, ch. 7).
7Because we assume away the credit market, the rate of return from investment in schooling
depends on consumption decisions and is in utility terms. Also note that, with inelastic labor
supply and linear utility, z10 = z01 = w1 and z20 = z02 = w2.
6it can inﬂuence whom one marries and the shares each spouse receives from the
marital surplus. In addition to the returns in the market or marriage, investment in
schooling is associated with idiosyncratic costs (beneﬁts) denoted by µi for men and
µj for women.
The idiosyncratic preference parameters are assumed to be independent of each
other and across individuals. We denote the distributions of θ and µ by F(θ) and G(µ)
and assume that these distributions are symmetric around their zero means. This
speciﬁcation is rather restrictive because one might expect some correlations between
the taste parameters and the observable attributes. For instance, individuals that
have a low cost of schooling may also have a high earning capacity and individuals
may derive diﬀerent beneﬁts from marriage depending on the observed quality of their
spouses. One may also expect a correlation between the emotional valuations of the
marriage by the two spouses. Thus, the model is very basic and intended mainly as
an illustration of the possible feedbacks between the marriage market and investment
in schooling.
3.2 The Marriage Market
Any stable assignment of men to women must maximize the aggregate surplus over all
possible assignments (Shapley and Shubik, 1972). The dual of this linear program-
ming problem posits the existence of non-negative shadow prices associated with the
constraints of the primal that each person can be either single or married to one
spouse. We denote the shadow price of woman j by uj and the shadow price of man
i by vi. The complementarity slackness conditions require that
zI(i)J(j) + θi + θj ≤ vi + uj, (3)
with equality if i and j are married and inequality otherwise.
Condition (3) is equivalent to
vi = Max{Max
j




[zI(i)J(j) + θi + θj − vi],0},
which means that the assignment problem can be decentralized. That is, given the
shadow prices uj and vi, each agent marries a spouse that yields the highest “proﬁt.”
Alternatively, we can view the shadow prices uj and vi as the reservation utility levels
that woman j and man i require to participate in any marriage.
Our speciﬁcation imposes a restrictive but convenient structure in which the in-
t e r a c t i o n sb e t w e e na g e n t sd e p e n do nt h e i rg r o u pa ﬃliation only, i.e., their level of
7schooling. Therefore, the endogenously-determined shadow prices of married man i
in I and married woman j in J can be written in the form,




[zIJ − UJ] and UJ = Max
I
[zIJ − VI] (6)
are the shares that the partners receive from the “material” surplus of the marriage
(not accounting for the idiosyncratic eﬀects θi and θj). All agents of a given type
receive the same share of the material surplus zIJ no matter whom they marry,
because all the agents on the other side rank them in the same manner. Any man
(woman) of a given type who asks for a higher share than the “going rate” cannot
obtain it because he or she can be replaced by an equivalent alternative.8
Although we assume equal numbers of men and women, it is possible that the
number of educated men and women will diﬀer. We shall assume throughout that
the variances in θ and µ are large enough to ensure that there will always be some
uneducated men who marry uneducated women and some educated men who marry
educated women. This means that the equilibrium shares must satisfy
U2 + V2 = z22, (7)
U1 + V1 = z11. (8)
We can then classify the possible matching patterns as follows. Under strict pos-
itive assortative mating, educated men marry only educated women and uneducated
men marry only uneducated women. Then,
U1 + V2 ≥ z21, (9)
U2 + V1 ≥ z12. (10)
If there are more educated men than women among the married, some educated
men will marry uneducated women and condition (9) also will hold as an equality.
If there are more educated women than men among the married, equation (10) will
8Our model features transferable utility and marriage markets that operate frictionlessly. As
such, the couples’ outside prospects—be it their utility as singles or in another potential marriage—
play an independent role in whether or not household allocations are made eﬃciently. Thus, no
committment mechanism exists between the potential spouses and the ability to remarry acts as a
substitute for commitment. This result holds even when there are some search frictions in spousal
matching. For more details on the role of commitment in intra-household allocations, see Lundberg
and Pollak (1993).
That noted, when spouses need to make career choices and investment in children, some com-
mitment to stay married may be required to implement the eﬃcient household division of labor if
spouses need to make career choices and time investment in children. We shall return to this topic
in subsection 4.4.
8hold as an equality. It is impossible that all four conditions will hold as equalities
b e c a u s et h i sw o u l di m p l y
z22 + z11 = z12 + z21, (11)
which violates assumption (2) that the education levels of the spouses are comple-
ments. Thus, either educated men marry uneducated women or educated women
marry uneducated men but not both.
When types mix and there are more educated men than educated women among
the married, conditions (7) to (9) imply
U2 − U1 = z22 − z21,
(12)
V2 − V1 = z21 − z11.
If there are more educated women then men among the married then conditions (7),
(8) and (10) imply
V2 − V1 = z22 − z12,
(13)
U2 − U1 = z12 − z11.
One may interpret the diﬀerences U2 − U1 and V2 − V1 as the return to schooling
in marriage for women and men, respectively. The quantity z22 − z21 which reﬂects
the contribution of an educated woman to the material surplus of a marriage with
an educated man provides an upper bound o nt h er e t u r nt h a taw o m a nc a no b t a i n
through marriage, while her contribution to a marriage with an uneducated man,
z12 − z11,p r o v i d e salower bound. When there are more educated women than men,
analogous bounds apply to men. When types mix in the marriage market equilibrium,
we see that the side that is in short supply receives the marginal contribution to
a marriage with an educated spouse, while the side in excess supply receives the
marginal contribution to a marriage with an uneducated spouse.
One issue of concern is whether the “material shares” deﬁned above are non-
negative. In practice, if the only means to transfer utility within couples is via
the transfer of consumption goods, which are bounded from below at zero, then
the non-negativity constraints on consumption bind, utility is no longer transferable
and it becomes diﬃcult to determine the stable assignments and the marital shares
that support these assignments. However, we may assume that the partners can
also exchange “signs of endearment” in which case the marital shares are no longer
material and can be negative or positive. In the subsequent analysis, we shall provide
examples in which the material shares are positive in equilibrium.
93.3 Investment Decisions
We assume rational expectations so that, in equilibrium, individuals know VI and UJ,
which are suﬃcient statistics for investment decisions. Given these shares and knowl-
edge of their own idiosyncratic preferences for marriage, θ, and costs of schooling, µ,
agents know for sure whether or not they will marry in the second period, conditional
on their choice of schooling.
Man i chooses to invest in schooling if
z20 − µi + Max(V2 + θi ,0) > 2z10 + Max(V1 + θi ,0). (14)
Similarly, woman j chooses to invest in schooling if
z02 − µj + Max(U2 + θj ,0) > 2z01 + Max(U1 + θj ,0). (15)
Figure 5 describes the choices made by diﬀerent men. Men for whom θ<−V2 do
not marry and invest in schooling if and only if µ<R m ≡ z20−2z10.M e n f o r w h o m
θ>−V1 always marry and they invest in schooling if and only if µ<R m + V2 − V1.
Finally, men for whom −V2 <θ<−V1 marry if they acquire education and do not
marry if they do not invest in schooling. These individuals will acquire education
if µ<R m + V2 + θ. In this range, there are two motivations for schooling: to raise
future earning capacity and to enhance marriage.
The proportion of men who invest in schooling is
G(R
m)F(−V2)+[ 1− F(−V1)]G(R




m + V2 + θ)f(θ)dθ, (16)
the proportion of men who marry is




m + V2 + θ)f(θ)dθ, (17)
and the proportion of men who invest and marry is
[1 − F(−V1)]G(R




m + V2 + θ)f(θ)dθ. (18)
The higher are the returns from schooling in the labor market, Rm, a n di nm a r -
riage, V2 − V1, the higher is proportion of men who acquire schooling. A common
increase in the levels V2 and V1 also raises investment because it makes marriage
more attractive and schooling obtains an extra return within marriage. For the same
reason, an increase in the market return Rm raises the proportion of men that marry.
Analogous expressions hold for women.
103.4 Equilibrium
In the marriage market equilibrium, the number of men and women who marry must










w + U2 + θ)f(θ)dθ. (19)
Under strictly positive assortative mating, the number of men and women in each
education group is equal. Given that we impose condition (19), it is necessary and
suﬃcient to require that the number of men and women who marry but do not invest
in schooling is the same. Using condition (18) and symmetry, we can write this
condition as
F(V1)G(−R
m + V1 − V2)=F(U1)G(−R
w + U1 − U2). (20)
Together with conditions (7) and (8), conditions (19) and (20) yield a system of four
equations in four unknowns that are, in principle, solvable.
If there is some mixing of types, equation (20) is replaced by an inequality and
the shares are determined by the boundary conditions on the returns to schooling
within marriage for either men or women, whichever is applicable. If there are more
educated men than women among the married,
F(V1)G(−R
m + V1 − V2) <F(U1)G(−R
w + U1 − U2) (20a)
and educated women receive their maximal return from marriage while men receive
their minimal return so that condition (12) holds. Conversely, if there are more
educated women than men among the married we have
F(V1)G(−R
m + V1 − V2) >F(U1)G(−R
w + U1 − U2) (20b)
and educated men receive their maximal return from marriage while educated women
receive their minimal return so that condition (13) holds. Together with condition
(7) and (8), we have four equations in four unknowns that are in principle solvable.9
The two types of solutions are described in Figures 6 and 7, where we depict the
equilibrium conditions in terms of V1 and V2 after we eliminate U1 and U2,u s i n g( 7 )
and (8). The two positively sloped green lines in these ﬁgures describe the boundaries
on the returns to schooling of men within marriage. The negatively sloped red line
describes the combinations of V1 and V2 that maintain equality in the number of men
9Note the system of equations consisting of (7), (8) and (11) and the system consisting of (7),
(8) and (12) impose only three independent requirements.
11and women who wish to marry. The positively sloped blue line describes the combi-
nations of V1 and V2 that maintain equality in the number of men and women with
each level of schooling among the married. The slopes of these lines are determined
by the following considerations: An increase in V1 (and a reduction in U1), keeping V2
and U2 constant, induces more men and fewer women to prefer marriage. An increase
in V2 holding V1 has a similar eﬀect. Thus, V1 and V2 are substitutes in terms of their
impact on the incentives of men to marry and U1 and U2 are substitutes in terms of
their impact on the incentives of women to marry. Therefore, equality in the number
o fm e na n dw o m e nw h ow i s ht om a r r yc a nb em a i n t a i n e do n l yi fV2 declines when
V1 rises.10 At the same time, an increase in V1 (and a reduction in U1), keeping V2
and U2 constant, reduces the return to education that men receive within marriage
and raises the return to education that women receive within marriage. Hence, fewer
educated men and more educated women will wish to marry. Therefore, equality in
t h en u m b e ro fe d u c a t e dm e na n dw o m e nw h ow i s ht om a r r yc a nb em a i n t a i n e do n l y
if V2 rises when V1 rises so that the rates of return to education within marriage are
restored.11
As long as the model is completely symmetric, that is Rm = Rw and z12 = z21, the
equilibrium is characterized by equal sharing: V2 = U2 = z22/2 and U1 = V1 = z11/2.
With these shares, men and women have identical investment incentives. Hence, the
number of educated (uneducated) men equals the number of educated (uneducated)
women, both among the singles and the married. Such a solution is described by
point e in Figure 6, where the lines satisfying conditions (19) and (20) intersect.
There is a unique symmetric equilibrium. However, with asymmetry, when either
Rm 6= Rw or z12 6= z21, there may be a mixed equilibrium where the line representing
10Diﬀerentiating (19),





g(Rm + V2 − θ)f(θ)dθ +
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11The slope line satisfying condition (20) must exceed 1 because
f(V1)G(Rm − (V1 − V2)) + f(z11 − V1)G(Rm − (z22 − z11)+( V1 − V2)]dV1







− 1 > 0.
12condition (19) intersect either the lower or upper bound on V2 −V1 so that condition
(20) holds as an inequality. Such a case is illustrated by the point e0 in Figure 7. In
this equilibrium, educated men obtain the lower bound on their return to education
within marriage, z21 −z11. The equilibrium point e0 is on the lower bound and above
the blue line satisfying condition (20), indicating excess supply of educated men.
4 Gender Diﬀerences in the Incentive to Invest
In this section, we discuss diﬀerences between women and men that can cause them
to invest at diﬀerent rates. We discuss two possible sources of asymmetry:
• Women may receive diﬀerent market wages, which may lead to lower returns
for single women.
• Women may receive a lower return from schooling within marriage because they
must take care of children.
Either of the above causes can induce women to invest less in schooling. Therefore,
the lower incentives of women to invest can create equilibria with mixing, where
educated men are in excess supply and some of them marry less-educated women.
4.1 The Household Production Technology
We use a rudimentary structural model to trace the impact of diﬀerent wages and
household roles of men and women on the marital output and surplus. We assume
that, irrespective of the diﬀerences in wages or household roles, men and women have
t h es a m ep r e f e r e n c e sg i v e nb y
u = cq + θ, (21)
where c is a private good, q is a public good that can be shared if two people marry
but is private if they remain single and θ is the emotional gain from being married
(relative to remaining single). The public good is produced within the household
according to a household production function
q = e + γt, (22)
where e denotes purchased market goods, t is time spent working at home and γ is
an eﬃciency parameter.
This speciﬁcation implies transferable utility between spouses and allows us to
trace the impact of diﬀerent market wages or household roles on the decisions to invest
and marry. Time worked at home is particularly important for parents with children.
To simplify, we assume that all couples have children and that rearing children requires
13as p e c i ﬁed amount of time t = τ,where τ is a constant such that 0 <τ<1. Moreover,
all t h et i m ep r o v i d e da th o m ei ss u p p l i e db yt h emother. Hence, women spend τ
amount of their time on childrearing and 1 − τ of it on market work.
If man i of class I with wage wm
I(i) marries woman j of class J with wage ww
J(j),
their joint income is wm
I(i)+(1−τ)ww
J(j). Any eﬃcient allocation of the family resources
maximizes the partners’ sum of utilities given by [wm
I(i)+(1−τ)ww
J(j)−e](e+τγ)+θi+θj,
which implies that the partners agree to spend half of the family income on the public
good. The marital output is, therefore,
oij =
[wm
I(i) + τγ+( 1− τ)ww
J(j)]2
4
+ θi + θj. (23)
Note that the wages of the husband and wife complement each other in generating
marital output, which is a consequence of sharing the child(ren)—the public good of
their marriage.





ci + ei = w
m
I(i), (25)
his optimal behavior generates a utility level of (wm
I(i)/2)2. A single woman j solves
an analogous problem and obtains (ww
I(i)/2)2. Therefore, the total material surplus
generated by the marriage in the second period is
sij =




+ θi + θj ≡ zI(i)J(j) + θi + θj .
(26)
The mother’s eﬀective wage is now a weighted average of her market wage and
productivity at home. We assume that w2 >γ>w 1 so that having children is
costly for educated women but not for uneducated women.12 The surplus function
(26) maintains complementarity between the wages of the husband and wife, which
is a consequence of sharing a public good.13 However, the assumed asymmetry in
12We also implicitly assume that the prerequisite for having oﬀspring is getting married. Thus,
while we do not model cohabitation, the implications of the model could apply to that as well.
13The expression in (26) applies only if, at the optimum, the family spends money on the public
good, e>0. Otherwise the surplus becomes





+ θi + θ,
in which case the surplus becomes additive. A suﬃcient condition for a positive e is w1+(1−τ)w1 >
τγ.
14household roles between men and women implies that a higher husband’s wage always
raises the surplus but a higher mother’s wage can reduce the surplus. In other words,
it may be costly for a high-wage woman to marry because she must spend time on
the child, while if the mother does not marry her utility as a single remains w2
J(j)/4.
In addition, it is no longer true that z21 = z12 as in the benchmark case. In fact,






+ τγ] > 0, (27)
which means that the marriage of an educated man with an uneducated woman
creates a larger marital surplus than the marriage of an educated woman with an
uneducated man.
4.2 Gender Roles I: The Impact of the Wage Gap
We are now ready to examine the implications of the gender wage diﬀerences. Let
w2 and w1 denote the wage that educated and uneducated men obtain, respectively,
and let d2w2 and d1w1 be the corresponding wages of women. The gender diﬀerence
in wages can be an outcome of discrimination associated, for instance, with lower
options for investment on the job.14 Such discrimination can reduce or increase the
incentives of women to invest, depending on whether discrimination is stronger at the
low or high levels of schooling.
We shall begin our analysis assuming that discrimination is uniform across school-
i n gl e v e l ss ot h a td1 = d2 ≡ δ<1. In this case, women have lower market return to
schooling investment than men.15 We shall later discuss a case in which discrimination
against educated women is weaker so that d1 < 1 and d2 =1 .












































for men and women, respectively. Thus, we have Rw = δ
2Rm <R m.
Starting from an initial situation of equality described by the point e in Figure 6,
consider an increase in the wages of educated men, wm
2 , combined with a reduction
14For related papers that emphasize the same dual-feedback mechanism between the intensity
homework and labor market wage rates we discuss here, see Albanesi and Olivetti (2005, 2006) and
Chichilnisky (2005).
15In standard human capital models in which the only costs of investment are forgone earnings and
the only returns are higher future earnings, uniform discrimination has no impact on investment.
In this model, however, the absolute market returns are added to the returns within marriage and
together determine investment decisions (see equations (14) and (15)) Therefore absolute market
returns matter.
15in the wages of educated women, ww
2 , holding the wages of uneducated men and
women at their benchmark value w1. To isolate the role of market returns, we assume
that the increase in the wage of educated men exactly compensates the reduction in
the wage of educated women so that marital output is unaﬀected and symmetry is
maintained.16 In other words, the change in wages aﬀect directly only the returns as
singles, Rm and Rw.
The higher market return from schooling of men encourages their investment in
schooling and also strengthens their incentives to marry, because schooling obtains
an additional return within marriage. In contrast, the lower return to schooling for
women reduces their incentives to invest and marry. These changes create excess
supply of men who wish to invest and marry. Consequently, to restore equilibrium,
the rates of returns that men receive within marriage must decline implying that for
any V1, the value of V2 that satisﬁes conditions (19) and (20) must decline. These
shifts in the equilibrium lines are represented by the broken blue and red lines in
Figure 8.
For moderate changes in wages, strictly positive assortative mating continues to
hold. However, the equilibrium value of V2 declines and educated men receive a lower
share than educated women when they marry each other. When the gap between Rm
and Rw becomes large, the equilibrium shifts to a mixed equilibrium, where some
educated men marry uneducated women. That is, because of their higher tendency
to invest some educated men must “marry down.” This equilibrium is represented
by the point e0 in Figure 8, where the broken red line representing equality in the
number of men and women that wish to marry (condition (19)) intersects the green
line representing the lower bound on the share that educated men obtain in the
marital surplus, z21 − z11. As seen, both V1 and V2 are lower in the new equilibrium
so that all men (women), educated and uneducated, receive lower (higher) shares of
the marital surplus when men have stronger market incentives to invest in schooling
than women.
These results on the shares of married men and women in the marital surplus
must be distinguished from the impact of the shares in the marital output. If men
get a higher return from schooling as singles, their share in the marital output can
increase even though they receive a lower share of the surplus.
4.3 Gender Roles II: The Impact of Children
Recall that we assume marriage is always associated with having children. To in-
vestigate what impact children can have on pre-marital investments and household
16When wages change zI(i)J(j) usually changes. Also, when wages diﬀer by gender, we generally
do not maintain symmetry in the contribution of men and women to marriage so that z12 6= z21. It
is only in the special case in which the product wm
I(i)ww
J(j) remains invariant under discrimination
that the marital surplus generated by all marriagesi si n t a c t .T h eq u a l i t a t i v er e s u l t sf o rs h a r e sa r e
not aﬀected by this simpliﬁcation.
16roles, ceteris paribus, we assume equal market wages for men and women so that δ =
1. Starting with the symmetric case with τ =0 , consider an increase in τ. Such an
increase reduces the contribution educated women make to marital output and raises
the contribution of uneducated women. That is, z11 and z21 rise because uneducated
women are more productive at home, γ>w 1, while z12 and z22 decline because ed-
ucated women are less productive at home, γ<w 2. Consequently, both equilibrium
lines corresponding to conditions (19) and (20) shift down so the V2 is lower for any
V1. A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h eb o u n d a r i e so nt h er a t eo fr e t u r n sf r o ms c h o o l i n gt h a tm e n
can obtain within marriage shift as z21−z11 rises and z22−z12 declines. These changes
are depicted in Figure 9.
For moderate changes in τ,strictly assortative mating with equal sharing continues
to hold. As long as a symmetric equilibrium is maintained, the returns to schooling
that men and women receive within marriage, V2−V1 and U2−U1, are equal. Hence,
men and women have the same incentives to invest. But because the surplus shares
(and consequently utilities within marriage) of educated men and women z22/2 decline
with τ, while those of uneducated men and women z11/2 rise, both men and women
will reduce their investment in schooling by the same degree.
As τ rises further, the diﬀerence in the contributions of men and women to mar-
r i a g ec a nr i s et ot h ee x t e n tt h a ta ne d u c a t e dm a nc o n t r i b u t e st oam a r r i a g ew i t h
u n e d u c a t e dw o m a nm o r et h a na ne d u c a t e dw o m a nc o n t r i b u t e st oam a r r i a g ew i t ha n
educated man.17 That is,
z21 − z11 >z 22 − z21. (30)
Condition (30) implies that the lower bound on the return to schooling that men
receive within marriage exceeds the upper bound on the return to schooling that
woman receive within marriage. In this event, the symmetric equilibrium in Figure
9 is eliminated and instead there is a mixed equilibrium with some educated men
marrying uneducated women (point e0 in Figure 9). This outcome reﬂects the lower
incentive of educated women to enter marriage and the stronger incentive of men to
17Consider the expression
h(w1 ,w 2,τ) ≡ 2z21 − z11 − z22 =2 [ w2 + τγ+( 1− τ)w1]2
−[w1 + τγ+( 1− τ)w1]2 − [w2 + τγ+( 1− τ)w2]2
as a function of w1 and w2 and τ. For w1 = w2 = γ, h(γ,γ,τ)=0and
h1(γ,γ,τ)=−4γτ,
h2(γ,γ,τ)=4 γτ.
Therefore, for a positive τ, w1 slightly below γ and w2 slightly above γ, h(w1,w 2,τ) > 0. Also
h3(w1,w 2,τ)=( w2 − w1)[w2(4 − 2τ)+2 τ(2γ − w1)] > 0
and for all w2 >γ>w 1,h (w1,w 2,0) < 0 and h(w1,w 2,1) > 0. Therefore, the larger is τ the broader
will be the range in which h(w1,w 2,0) > 0.
17invest because their return from schooling within marriage, V2−V1 = z21−z11, exceeds
the return to schooling that women can obtain within marriage. Consequently, some
educated men must marry “down” with uneducated women.
4.4 Division of Labor and Career Choice
We can further reﬁne the family decision problem by letting the partners decide
whether to have children and who shall take care of them. Reinterpreting τ as a
temporal choice, imagine that one of the partners must ﬁrst spend τ units of time
during marriage on the child(ren) and later enter the labor market and work for the
remainder of the period (length 1 − τ).
An important idea of Becker (1991, ch. 2) is that wage diﬀerences among identical
spouses can be created endogenously and voluntarily because of learning by doing and
increasing returns. Thus, it may be optimal for the household for one of the spouses
to take care of the child(ren) and the other to enter the labor market immediately,
thereby generating a higher wage in the remainder of the period. Because we assume
transferable utility between spouses, household roles will be determined eﬃciently by
each married couple.18 Also, because human capital is to some extent self productive,
the spouse with more education will specialize in market work. Thus, by choosing
schooling ahead of marriage one can inﬂuence his\her household role within marriage.
As we stated above, the ability to remarry acts as a substitute for commitment in
models of frictionless matching and this result holds even when there are some search
frictions in spousal matching. However, the existence of children and, in particular,
their custody assignment in divorce can produce asymmetric costs of committing to
having children or childrearing time (especially if doing so aﬀects one’s labor market
wages subsequently). Thus, to implement the eﬃcient outcome, there is need for
some commitment. We can assume that at the time of marriage, each couple agrees
on the eﬃcient household division of labor and to divide the resulting household
surplus according to the anticipated, market-determined marital shares. In addition,
each spouse commits not to divorce. Then, when marital output is realized, there is
18The required level of eﬃciency is a conditional one. In particular, the household choices need to
be eﬃcient taking as given the pre-marital decisions made by each spouse (and how those decisions
manifest themselves in spousal inputs to the marriage). In fact, Iyigun (2005) and Iyigun-Walsh
(2005) demonstrate that large marriage and frictionless markets produce unconditionally eﬃcient
outcomes in which both pre-marital investments and intra-household allocations are Pareto eﬃcient.
For more detail on the eﬃciency of investments and spousal allocations, also see Browning et al. (in
progress, ch. 7).
In addition, Chichilnisky (2005) shows that eﬃcient household assignment need not be eﬃcient
from the economy’s point of view, because the eﬀects of household work on market productivity
are not fully internalized by the household. Speciﬁcally, a wife who works more at home may be
assigned in the labor market to a man who works less at home and their total output would be
higher if they would have been equally productive.
18no mutual gain from renegotiation and therefore the ex-ante agreement will not be
renegotiated so that expectations are in fact realized.19
Suppose now that men and women are ex-ante identical and there are no pre-
determined household roles. If an educated woman (man) marries a less-educated
m a n( w o m a n )t h e nt h em o r ee d u c a t e ds p o u s ew i l lw o r ki nt h em a r k e ta n dt h eo t h e r
will stay at home. Anticipating that, each gender has the same incentives to edu-
cate and therefore a strictly assortative matching pattern arises with equal number
of men and women in each education class. In particular, note that equation (26)
applies and attains the same value for all couples. As a result, we have z12 = z21.
Moreover, since men and women are ex-ante identical, Rm = Rw. The equilibrium in
this case is unique, symmetric and characterized by equal sharing V2 = U2 = z22/2
and U1 = V1 = z11/2. With these shares, men and women have identical investment
incentives. Hence, the number of educated (uneducated) men equals the number
of educated (uneducated) women, both among the singles and the married. In this
equilibrium, it is immaterial who works at home and who works in the market and
the two spouses obtain equal shares of the maximized marital output.
If, however, women receive lower market wages as we discussed in subsection 4.2,
then we have
sij =





+ θi + θj ≡ zI(i)J(j) + θi + θj ,
(31)
if husband i works in the market and wife j stays at home, and
sij =





+ θi + θj ≡ zI(i)J(j) + θi + θj ,
(32)
if husband i stays home and wife j works in the market. Thus, if the partners jointly
maximize the surplus, the spouse that will take care of the children is the one with
the lower market wage.
Given that, for all matches between man i and woman j (31) exceeds (32), each
couple will assign the wife to stay at home, which will erode her future market wage
19Lundberg and Pollak (1993, pp. 1002-1006) discuss in elaborate detail the role of commitment in
intra-household allocations and spousal transfers. Their primary focus is on the mode of household
decision-making (i.e., cooperative versus non-cooperative Nash bargaining) and how the existence
of transfers between the spouses can alter the allocation of resources under the non-cooperative
form. Lundberg and Pollak conclude that either commitment to a transfer scheme within couples
prior to the formation of their marriage, or the ability to null a marriage and remarry costlessly
and frictionlessly both produce eﬃcient outcomes (due to spousal competition in large marriage
markets).
19and reinforce the unequal division of labor. Similarly, if there are predetermined
household roles such that women must take care of the child(ren) then women will
e n du pw i t hl o w e rm a r k e tw a g e s . T h u s ,i n e q u a l i t ya th o m ea n dt h em a r k e ta r ei n -
terrelated. Models of statistical discrimination tie household roles and market wages
through employers beliefs about female participation. Typically, such models gen-
erate multiple equilibria and ineﬃciency (Hadﬁeld, 1999, Lommerud and Vagstad,
2002). Here, we do not require employers’ beliefs to be correct. Instead, we think of
household roles and discrimination as processes that evolve slowly and can be taken
as exogenous in the medium run.
4.5 Why Women May Acquire More Schooling than Men
We have examined two possible reasons why women may invest less than men in
schooling. The ﬁrst reason is that women may receive lower return from investment
in the market because of discrimination. The second reason is that women may receive
a lower return to schooling in marriage because of the need to care for children (due to
social and cultural norms or the biological time requirements of childcare), in which
case the contribution of schooling to marital output is lower.
Over time, fertility has declined and female wages have risen in industrialized
countries, a pattern being replicated in many developing countries too, which is con-
sistent with the increased investment in education of women. The fact that women
are now slightly more educated than men, on average, appears surprising given the
fact that women still earn substantially less than men. However, in dealing with
investments in education, the crucial issue is whether the gender wage gap rises or
declines with schooling, or equivalently, whether women obtain a higher rate of re-
turn from schooling. There is some evidence that this is indeed the case and that the
gender gap declines with schooling (Dougherty, 2005).
Now consider a comparison of the following two situations. An “old” regime in
which married women must spend a relatively large fraction of their time at home and
a “new” regime in which, because of reductions in fertility and improved technology
in home production, married women spend less time at home and work more in the
market (Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu, 2005). Assume further that women
suﬀer from statistical discrimination because employers still expect them to invest
less on the job. However, this discrimination is weaker against educated women that
a r ee x p e c t e dt os t a yi nt h el a b o rm a r k e t .T h e n ,i ti sp o s s i b l et h a ti nt h en e wr e g i m e
women will invest in schooling more than men. The presence of discrimination raises
the return of women relative to men because schooling serves as an instrument for
women to escape discrimination. The fact that women are still tied up in homework
lowers their return from schooling relative to men because women obtain lower returns
from schooling within marriage. However, as women raise their participation, this
second eﬀect weakens and the impact of discrimination can dominate.
20In Figure 10, we display the transition between the two regimes. We assume that
d2 >d 1 so that discrimination against women is lower at higher level of schooling.
This feature generates stronger incentives for women than for men to invest in school-
i n g .H o w e v e r ,t h ef a c tt h a tw o m e nm u s ts p e n dt i m ew o r k i n ga th o m er e d u c e sh a st h e
opposite eﬀect. We then reduce the amount of time that the mother has to spend at
home and raise d2, which strengthens the incentives of women to invest in schooling
and to marry. Therefore, an increase in V2 relative to V1 is required to maintain
equality between the number of men who wish to invest and marry and the number
of women who wish to invest and marry. This eﬀect is represented by the upwards
shifts to the broken red and blue lines in Figure 10. The impact is assumed to be
large enough to generate an equilibrium in which the two equilibrium requirements—
equality of the number of women and men that wish to acquire schooling and marry
(the broken blue line) and equality of the total number of men and women that
wish to marry (the broken red line)—yield an intersection above the upper bound on
the returns from schooling that men can receive within marriage. Therefore, strictly
positive assortative mating cannot be sustained as an equilibrium and the outcome
is a mixed equilibrium in which there are more educated women than men among
the married and some educated women marry uneducated men. This new mixed
equilibrium is indicated by the point e00 in Figure 10.
The result that there are more educated women among the married does not, by
itself, imply that women invest in schooling more than men. But, in this example,
we assume that women have higher return from schooling as singles so that there are
also more educated women among the singles. The basic logic is that the gender with
higher market returns invests more in schooling and as, a consequence, has higher
incentives to marry, which can drive the returns to schooling within marriage of that
gender to the lower bound, where an excess supply of the educated members of that
gender among the married as well as among the singles is created.
4.5.1 A numerical example
Suppose that µ and θ are uniformly distributed on the interval [−3,3] and that








Thus women earn less than men, d1 = .5 and d2 = .7. However, the absolute and
relative wage gains from schooling are larger for women. We set γ =2so that an
educated woman is more productive in the market and uneducated women are more
21productive at home, . Note that educated women can earn more than uneducated
men. The assumed wages imply the utility levels of single men and women given
below
Uneducated Educated
Men z10 =1 .00 z20 =2 .25 Rm = z20 − 2z10 = .25
Women z01 = .25 z02 =1 .10 Rw = z02 − 2z01 = .60
Thus, women enjoy higher returns from schooling as singles (in utility terms),
reﬂecting the reduction in the gender wage gap as schooling rises.
Now consider a change in regimes such that the wife has to spend less time at
home (τ declines from .6 to .25) and wages of educated women rise (from wm
2 =2 .1
to wm
2 =2 .4) holding all other wages constant. A direct eﬀect of this change is an
increase in the returns to schooling of single women from Rw = .60 to Rw = .94. The
marriage market implications of these changes are summarized in tables 1-3 below.
Table 1: Impact of parameter changes on marital surplus
Old regime: τ = .6,γ=2 ,d 1 = .5,d 2 = .7 New regime: τ = .25,γ=2 ,d 1 = .5,d 2 = .8
U n e d .w i f e E d u c .w i f e
Uned. husband z11 =1 .99 z12 =2 .10
Educ.. husband z21 =2 .79 z22 =3 .00
Uned. wife Educ. wife
Uned. husband z11 =1 .39 z12 =2 .40
Educ. husband z21 =2 .02 z22 =3 .33
.
A decrease in the amount of time worked at home, raises the contribution of and
educated women to the marital surplus and lowers the contribution of uneducated
women. In the old regime, with τ = .6, the marital surplus declines with the education
of the wife when the husband is uneducated, while in the new regime with τ = .25
it rises. This happens because educated women are more productive in the market
than uneducated women but, by assumption, equally productive at home. Even if
the wife has the higher wage, which happens when the husband is uneducated, it is
still costly to have an educated wife, because the opportunity cost is the wage of an
uneducated woman that could replace the husband in home work him if he would
marry her.
Table 2: Impact of parameter changes on the equilibrium shares
Old regime: τ = .6,γ=2 ,d 1 = .5,d 2 = .7 New regime: τ = .25,γ=2 ,d 1 = .5,d 2 = .8
Uneducated Educated
Men V1 = .82 V2 =1 .62
Women U1 =1 .17 U2 =1 .38
Uneducated Educated
Men V1 = .78 V2 =1 .71
Women U1 = .60 U2 =1 .62
22The implied returns from schooling within marriage in the old regime are
U2 − U1 =1 .38 − 1.17 = z22 − z21 =3 .00 − 2.79 = .21 ,
V2 − V1 =1 .62 − .82 = z21 − z11 =2 .79 − 1.99 = .80 .
That is men receive the lower bound on their return from schooling within marriage
while women receive the upper bound on their return from schooling. This pattern
is reversed in the new regime
U2 − U1 =1 .62 − .61 = z12 − z11 =2 .40 − 1.40 = 1.0
V2 − V1 =1 .71 − .78 = z22 − z12 =3 .33 − 2.40 = .93,
where women receive their lower bound and men receive their upper bound. Both
men and women receive higher returns froms c h o o l i n gw i t h i nm a r r i a g ei nt h en e w
regime because the eﬀective wage of educated women τγ+( 1− τ)wm
2 has risen and
the wages of the two spouses complement each other.
Table 3: Impact of parameter changes on the equilibrium investment and marriage rates∗
Old regime: τ = .6,γ=2 ,d 1 = .5,d 2 = .7 New regime: τ = .25,γ=2 ,d 1 = .5,d 2 = .8
Married Unmarried All
Educ. .510, .463 .125, .162 .635, .625
Uned. .207,. 253 .158, .121 .365, .383
All .717, .717 .284, .284 1
Married Unmarried All
Educ. .535,. 621 .116, .151 .651, .772
Uned. .191,. 105 .157, .123 .349, .228
All .726, .726 .284, .284 1
∗ The ﬁrst entry in each cell refers to men and the second entry refers to women
In the old regime, more men invest in schooling than women and some educated
men marry down with uneducated women. This pattern is reversed in the new regime
and women invest in schooling more than men and some educated women marry down
with uneducated men. Educated women are less likely to marry than educated men,
because their return for schooling in marriage is lower, anticipating that they will do
the home work if they marry educated men. This eﬀect is stronger in the old regime
where the time requirements at home are relatively large.
So far, we assumed that couples choose household eﬃciently and if the wife more
educated than her husband she goes to work full time and the husband takes care
of the children. It is interesting to examine the impact of social norms such that
the wife is always responsible for child care, irrespective of who has the higher wage.
An interesting feature of this example is that such norms have only a small eﬀect
on the outcomes (compare tables 3 and 4). Note, ﬁrst, that in the old regime such
norms have no eﬀect whatsoever, as long as a mixed equilibrium is maintained such
that there are more educated men than women among the married and some men
23marry uneducated women. In such an equilibrium, there are no couples in which the
wife is more educated than her husband, and couples that do marry satisfy the norm
because the wage of an educated wife is lower than that of and educated husband,
hence it is eﬃcient that the wife takes care of the children.
In the new regime, where the mixing is reversed and there are married couples
in which the wife is more educated, the presence of norms reduces diminishes the
gains from mixed marriages as z12 drops from 2.4 to 2.18 and the consequences for
t h em a r r i a g em a r k e ta r ed i s p l a y e di nt a b l e s4a n d5 .
The marriage rate, investment rate and the proportion of educated women who
wish to marry decline when educated women are forced to stay at home. Men,
however, increase their investment in schooling and uneducated men are less inclined
to marry, due to the loss of eﬃciency in mixed marriages with a wife which is more
educated than the husband.
Table 4: Impact of norms on equilibrium investment and marriage rates in the new regime∗
Eﬃcient allocation Wife always works at home
Married Unmarried All
Educ. .535,. 621 .116, .151 .651, .772
Uned. .191 ,.105 .157, .123 .349, .228
All .726, .726 .284, .284 1
Married Unmarried All
Educ. .564,. 592 .111, .157 .675, .746
Uned. .161,. 133 .160, .119 .325, .351
All .725, .725 .285, .285 1
∗ The ﬁrst entry in each cell refers to men and the second entry refers to women
Changes in the equilibrium shares are associated with the changes in marriage and
investment patterns described above. Because educated women and uneducated men
generate together a lower surplus shares they both lose surplus shares in all marriages
( including marriages of educated women with educated men). Educated men gain
from the reduced share of their wives, while uneducated women who are married to
uneducated men obtain also obtain a larger surplus share. ,All these changes reﬂect
the weekend competitiveness of educated women. Thus the return for schooling that
men receive within marriage rise while the return for schooling that women receive
decline, supporting the rise in the proportion of men who acquire schooling and the
reduction in the proportion of women that acquire schooling.
Table 4: Impact of norms on the equilibrium shares in the new regime
Eﬃcient allocation Wife always works at home
Uneducated Educated
Men V1 = .78 V2 =1 .71
Women U1 = .60 U2 =1 .62
Uneducated Educated
Men V1 = .61 V2 =1 .76
Women U1 = .77 U2 =1 .56
245C o n c l u s i o n s
In standard models of human capital, individuals invest in schooling with the antici-
pation of being employed at a higher future wage that would compensate them for the
current foregone earnings. In this paper, we add another consideration: the anticipa-
tion of being matched with another agent with whom one can share consumption and
coordinate work activities. Schooling has an added value in this context because of
complementarity between agents, whereby the contribution of the agent schooling to
marital output rises with the schooling of his\her spouse. In the frictionless marriage
market considered here, the matching pattern is fully predictable and supported by
a unique distribution of marital gains between partners. Distribution is governed by
competition, because for each agent there exist a perfect substitute that can replace
him\her in marriage. There is thus no scope for bargaining and, therefore, premar-
ital investments are eﬃcient. This simple framework allows us to jointly determine
investment and marriage patterns as well as the welfare of men and women under a
variety of circumstances.
One of our main ﬁndings is that, when the market return to education and house-
hold roles are gender neutral, men and women acquire education in equal proportions
and, under the assumption that the schooling of the two spouses complement each
other, a strictly positive assortative matching arises in the marriage markets. That
is, educated men marry only educated women and uneducated men marry only un-
educated women. But if the returns are not gender neutral, then there is mixing in
equilibrium where some educated individuals marry uneducated spouses and individ-
uals of the gender that marries down obtains a lower return from schooling within
marriage. In particular, we show that a transition from an old regime in which women
are required to work at home and expect lower market wages to a new regime where
less work is required at home and the wages of educated women become more in line
with that of educated men, women may overtake men in terms of schooling, despite
their lower market wage rate and higher amount of housework compared with men.
From the perspective of family economics, gender diﬀerences in investment in
schooling are of particular interest because assortative mating based on schooling is
a common feature of marriage patterns in modern societies. However, schooling is an
acquired trait that responds to economic incentives. We mentioned two interrelated
causes that may diminish the incentives of women to invest in schooling: lower mar-
ket wages and larger amount of household work. Although we did not fully specify
the sources of discrimination against women in the market, we noted that such dis-
crimination tends to decline with schooling and therefore increases the incentive to
invest. This is a possible explanation for the slightly higher investment in schooling
by women that we observe today. We do not view this outcome as a permanent phe-
nomenon but rather as a part of an adjustment process, whereby women who now
e n t e rt h el a b o rm a r k e ti ni n c r e a s i n gn u m b e r s , following technological changes at home
and in the market that favor women, must be “armed” with additional schooling to
25overcome norms and beliefs that originate in the past.
We should add that there are other possible reasons for why women may invest in
schooling more than men. One reason is that there are more women than man in the
marriage market at the relatively young ages at which schooling is chosen, because
woman marry younger. Iyigun and Walsh (2005) have shown, using a similar model
to the one discussed here, that in such a case women will be induced to invest more
than men in competition for the scarce males. Another reason is that divorce and
divorce is more harmful to women, because men are more likely to initiate divorce
w h e nt h eq u a l i t yo fm a t c hi sr e v e a l e dt ob el o w .T h i sa s y m m e t r yi sd u et ot h eh i g h e r
income of men and the usual custody arrangements (see Chiappori and Weiss, 2005).
In such a case, women may use schooling as an insurance device that mitigates their
costs from unwanted divorce.
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28Figure 1: Proportion of some college, college and advance education by sex, 30-40
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Figure 2: Impacts of higher degrees (relative to high school) on log-wages, adjusted






























Some college_female College_female MA and PHD_female
Some college_male College_male MA and PHD_male
29Figure 3: Educational Attainment of Spouses
Figure 3: Proportions of Couples in which: Both Spouses have the Same Degree, 
Husband has a Higher Degree and Wife has the Higher Degree, by Husband's 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Spouse's Education by Own Level of Schooling, Ages 20-60
31Figure 5: Regions for Marriage and Investment
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32Figure 6: Equilibrium with Strictly Positive Assortative Matching
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33Figure 7: Mixed Equilibrium with More Educated Men than Women
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34Figure 8: The Impact of an Increase in the Wage of Educated Men Combined
with a Reduction in the Wage of Educated Women
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35Figure 9: The Impact of an Increase in the Wife’s Work at Home
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36Figure 10: The Impact of an Increase in the Wife’sWork at Home Combined
with a Reduction in the Wage of Uneducated Women
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